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Excellencies, 
Ladies and Gentlemen: 
I am making today what my French friends would call a «visite éclair>. 
lo Lisbon. Yet, even in a crowded programme Df meetings with the Pre· 
sident, Prime Minister and senior ministers, I am delighted to have this 
opportunity to adress a wider audience publicly on the future of our Atlantic 
AIliance. And I wish to thank the National Defence Institute for giving me 
this platform and for bringing together this distinguished audicnce of opinion 
leadel's, officials and military offieers ali bound by a common interest in 
security and defence questions. 
Today it has become fashionable to speak of al1 <<Ídentity crisis •• of the 
Alliance, because the security envil'onment that gave birth to NATO, and 
with which it has lived for forty years, has suddenly gane. Some common· 
tators argue that our Alliance has become the victim of its o\Vn success 01' 
has fulfillcd a kind of long·standing dream: to crcate a peaceful Europe in 
which a politico.military Alliance like NATO would be altogether superfluous. 
Others do no! go that far, but believe nonetheless lhat security is today less 
important 01' can be had more easily. Well. it is of course true that Europc 
and the wider world have changed - dramatically and pel'manently. Old 
problems have lost much of Iheir saliency. New problems have appeared on 
the scene 01' become more acute. Yet, for my part, however much I welcome 
this change for having made our world arder significantly more coopera tive 
and potentially secure, I see nothing that convinces me that security itself 
is less important. Indeed in a time Df rapid change it becomes more 
important. 
In lhe first place, the Iesson of the past two years is that change itseU 
can be sudden and unpredictable. Which means things can change for the 
(.) Speech By The Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Manfred W6rncr, pronounced at 
the National Defence Institute. 
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worse as well as for the better. The Gulf crisis illustrates lhis. Peace, like 
democracy, will always require vigilance. 
Europe has not yet found its final new shape. Nor has it become a haven 
of tranquility. The fate of glasnot and perestroika is still uncertain, and it is 
an open question where the dramatic current developments in the Soviet 
Union will ultimately lead. Notwithstanding ali our encouragement and con-
crete assistance, we equally cannot yet tell if the courageous revolutions of 
the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, driven by the quest for freedom, 
will actually produce successful democracies and economic reforms. In many 
places oId ethnic problems, border disputes and power struggles have reared 
their head. Nationalism, a force we believed was approaching extinction, is 
trumpeting its resurrection with fanfare in many parts of Europe. 
If states give up their defences or allow collective structures of security 
like NATO to disintegrate, they will only create vacuums around them. 
These might sooner or Iater tempt potential aggressors or create insecurity in 
other states. The result would be a retum to the disastrous power politics and 
unstable alliances of past centuries. Defence would be renationalized. Even 
in a time of peace we would thereby sow the seeds of future instability as 
nations once again compete with each other and against each other for their 
security. 
Finally there are new challenges disturbing developments beyond Europe 
which we cannot disregard. The Iraqi aggression against Kuwait is the delibe· 
rate attempt to eliminate a UN member from the world map - what Sir 
MiehaeI Howard has termed: «state murden>. 
11 is also a challenge to the West on several leveis: the moral issue of 
seeing a small state taken over by a larger neighbour; the political issue of 
seeing an aspiring regional power acquire weapons of mass destruction; the 
economic issue of a major disruption in the supply of oil at a crucial moment 
in the economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe and with many 
Third World states in a precarious situation; the issue of Iong term stability 
in the alr~ady explosive area that is the Middle East and, last but not least, 
the human challenge of thousands of refugees and hostages whose lives have 
been put at risk. Thus the Gulf crisis combines an act of brutal annexation 
- something of which history of course gives us many sad examples - with 
a host of new issues which make tbis crisis not only a threat to our security 
but also to our efforts to build a new order based on restraint, cooperation 
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and the rule of law. For both reasons it is a struggle that neither we, nor the 
international community at large, can afford to lose. 
Thus it would be foolhardy for us to treat the residual risks, whether 
in Europe or the wider world, as the innoeuous side-effects or historiea! 
upheaval. This AIliance can stamp its imprint on events. Our vision of a 
Europe whole and free, and of a more secure and cooperative intemational 
order, is a realistie possibility. Yet the ambivalence of an era of enormous 
ehange - with its opportunities and risks - meaos that we ean have ao 
influence only if we are united and determined; and if we maintain a seeure 
defence. 
The most important vehicJe for this collective entreprise is the Atlantie 
AIliance. From the outset it has always been a community of destiny and a 
forum for nations that are joined together by common values, convictions 
and basie interests. A politieal aIliance thus, but equipped with military means. 
Today, at a time when the direct threat to our seeurity has dwindled, its 
politica! role is becoming ever more significant. 
That role lies 
- in the shaping of East-West relations 
- in the construction of a new European security architecture 
- in steering the arms control process 
- in maintaining a healthy transatlantie relationship. 
In alI these areas the Alliaoee ean and must strlve to ensure the deve-
lopment, discussion and formulation of a eoordinated Westem approaeh. 
Where else could tms task be earried out, if not in the Alliance? Only the 
Atlantie Alliance incorporates the United States and Canada as well as 
important states on the European periphery that are not members of the 
European Community; and without the North Ameriean democracies, Euro-
pean seeurity ean neither be built nor maintained. 
If the Alliance were to disappear tomorrow, the community of destiny 
that Alliance has established between the North Ameriean and European 
democracies would be irreparably damaged. Both continents, whose popula-
tions will represent less than 10% of the world total by the end of the 
eentury, would be isolated; and that at a time when their active solidarity 
will be as neeessary to face the challenges of tomorrow as those of yesterday: 
- without a cJose working relationship to North America, how ean the 
European democracies balance the continuing and enormous miJitary 
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might of the Soviet Union which will of course remain a factor cven 
in the cooperative order that we are striving for? 
- how could they respond to the immense challenge of social and 
economic reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europc; 
- and, finally, how could they meet the challenges of the North-South 
agenda I referred to earlier and to which Em'ope, with its numerous 
Mediterranean neighbours, and trading economies must perforce bc 
especially sensitive? 
FinaIly the Alliance is altogether indispensable in guaranteeing stability 
in Europe and even beyond. This is no less true in times of a reduced direct 
and immediate threat to our security - I would even say more so. For the 
tbreat posed by the massive Soviet military presence in Central Europe was 
in its way predictable and relatively easy to quantify. Now we see new 
risks to our security lhat are less easy to predict and to quantify, and which 
consequently cannot be managed in the same way tha! we dealt with the 
European balance of military power in the pasto 
The new risks therefore are no longer confined to a mililary at1ack 011 
our territory but are as likely to originate from a breakdowll in regional 
stability that would eilher spill over into our Alliance's own area or alterna-
tively be exploited against our interests and solidarity. As, for instanee, in 
using the oil weapon, terrorism ar hostages against uso 
Over the last two years the Atlantic Alliunce has undergone fundamental 
change. Its centre of gravity is moving from the military to the political role, 
from confrontation to cooperation, from peace keeping to peaee building, 
from the staving oH a elear and present danger to the more long term and 
prudent provision against futuro risks, from an alliance under Ameriaan 
leadership to a partnership bctween North America and Europe. 
The London Deelaration the Heads of Slate and Government of the 
Atlantic Alliance accordingly states that «security and stability do not lio 
solely in the military dimension ... We intend lo enhance lhe polilical com-
ponenl of the Alliance». NATO has always been a political uHiance, as is 
shown in the political objectives and common values already seI oul in the 
Washington Treaty of 1949 and subsequcntly amplified in the Alliance's 
intensive political consultations. Yel, this polilical role is now becaming 
stranger still. In the future, the Alliance will be called upon more forcefully 
than up to now to contribute to the construction of a new European security 
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order, and to enhance long term security through new responsabilities: coope-
ration in the polítical field, military contacts, confidence-building, disarma-
ment, and verification. 
Our main tasks wil! be: 
First wil! be to build a new European architecture, a new European 
order of cooperation, to include the Soviet Union and lhe other countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. We must not allow lhe old East-West ideolo-
gical division of Europe to be replaced by a new division based on wealth 
and líving standards. This is a major preoccupation of many of the new 
democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe, as I know from my 
recent visits there. Such a gap may be inevitable in lhe short term but it 
wil! undermine our stability if it persists. Equally we must not isolate the 
Soviet Union from Europe. It has much to contribute and needs our assistance 
to overcome its immense domestic problems. 
Our Alliance concept or a future pan-European architecture of coope-
ration provides for four supporting pillars on whlch such a Europe whole 
and free can securely resl. First there is the European Community, then an 
inslitutionalized CSCE process, then the Council of Europe which we hope 
to makc into a parllamentary assembly for the whole of Europe, and last 
but not least the Atlantic Alliance as the indispensable underpinning of 
security. 
Of course, no-one ean deny that since the Helsinki Final Act fifteen 
years ago, the CSCE proeess has been a urtique sucess story; it has, 
without doubt, developed into a key element of any future European structure; 
and one that wil! aequire many core security functions in the líght of the 
probable dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The increased 
institutionalísation of the CSCE process is a eommon goal of ali the Allies. 
By endowing CSCE with a new system of polítical eonsultations and giving 
it pan-European functions in such fields as information exchange, the obser-
vation of unusual military activities, the implementation of arms control 
agreements, and the resolution of eonflicts, we ean open a new institutional 
chapter in the polítieal development of our entire eontinent. lndeed the 
proposals of our London Summit Oeclaration for institutionalizing the CSCE 
have found broad consensus among the 34. Now that a CFE treaty has been 
practically agreed, we have the basis for a very suecessful CSCE Summit in 
Paris in two weeks time which really should líve up to the expectation tha! 
it wil! give birth to a new European architecture. 
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Yet to infer from this that the eolleetive security system of the Atlantie 
Allianee will beeome superfluous - even over the long term - would be a 
mistake. New CSCE struetures ean bridge old antagonisms, and ean lead 
to new, and eommon coneepts for the enhaneement of peaee and partnership. 
However, CSCE eannot provide firm seeurity guarantees against potential 
future risks. It requires consensus whieh is diffieult to obtain while eaeh 
of the 34 states has a veto right, and the CSCE states do not yet share 
common values or common social systems. Thus for the foreseeabIe future 
the CSCE eannot ensure stability ande the neeessary degree af insuranee 
against risks which is pravided uniquely by the calleetive defenee capaeities 
af aur Alliance. 
The reIationship between the AJlianee and CSCE must be eamplemen-
tary, not ane af either/ar. It will be the task af aur AJliance to provide 
stability and to build the basis for cooperatian. A cahesive Alliance is thus 
the prerequisite for a smoothly functianing CSCE. The natians af Central 
and Eastero Europe have in faet been more explicit than many af aur awn 
Westero apinian leaders in reeagnizing that the cantinuatian af NATO as 
a stabilizing element in a Eurapean security structure is indispensable. 
The Eurapean Cammunity will play a key role in the construction af 
a new Europe. It is in the interests of the Atlantic AlJiance that Europe not 
only unites economieally but also politically. But it is aIso essential that in 
striving for sueh unity, we do nat marginalize or exclude natians that wish 
to be part af this pracess. All of our future European structures will be stron-
ger and more durable to the extent that they are inclusive, nat exclusive. 
Mareover the politica1 unian af Europe is not feasibIe without the inclusion 
af security and defence. The Allianee's London Declaration explicitly supparts 
this goal. We want a united Europe. A strong Eurape means a strong Atlantic 
Alliance. Such a European seeurity identity will be aehieved within the 
framework of our Alliance, because even a European defence community-
which is still many years away - cannat replace the transatlantie link guaran-
teed by the Atlantic Alliance. As a result, all ideas and developments reIated 
to that European security identity shouId be coordinated with our Alliance 
fram their inception, so that both institutions reinforce each ather. In this 
context we must preserve NATO's integrated military structure. It is a unique 
achievement, and ensures lhat no-one will be tempted to renatianalize security. 
Second we must further intensify our growing contacts with the nations 
of Central and Eastero Eurape. The Landan Summit Declaration sent a 
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powerful message to those nations: that the Cold War a"d the years of con-
frontation are over; that the Alliance considers these nations to be fr1cnds ar.d 
potential partners; that it wishes henceforth to work with them to build a r,ew 
Europe; and that through our diplGmatic and military contacts we can 
build our ft:l:tre security together and according to strategies and doctrines 
that give maximetm reassurance. Certainly the message that thc Alliance is 
chonging and will continue to change, which was conveyed in ali the overtures 
we made at the London Summit to the nations of Central and Eastem Europe, 
has been very well received. For instance this timely message played a key 
role, just two weeks after the Sumit, in persuading the Soviet Union to agree 
to a united Germany being a full member of the Aliiance - perhaps the 
single must important contribution to stability in Europe. I myself, in visinting 
the countries of Central and Eastem Europe, have been pleasantly surprised 
to see how positively our Allianee is now seen, despite years of disinformation 
and propaganda. 
It is this adaptability of our Aliiance, refleeting change but also actively 
shaping that change, which makes me optimistic about the way in whieh it 
will fulfil its security mission in the years ahead. The conditions for a ncw 
Europeun security struclure, that will lastingly guarantee peace by means of 
a network of cooperative ties, have now been achieved. Provided we proceed 
sensibly, remain vigilant and use our diplomatic skills to full affect, we can 
look forward to decades of peaceful evolution in Europe. 
Thus our AlIiance remains indispcnsable, regardless of whether the 
Warsaw Pact is successfully reshaped into a politica!, democratic alliance ar, 
as seems more likely disappears fram the scene altogether. The role of 
ensuring stability and a secure defence is one that cannot be transferred from 
the Atlantic Aliiance to another body. Only NA TO will guarantee the presenee 
of the NOi'th Ameriean democraties in Europe tomorrow, as it has always 
dane in the pasto Without this political as well as military presence, Europe 
could not be certain of stability, at least for the foreseeable future. Finally 
no other body but the Atlantic AlIiance with its military potentia! can ensure 
that military force is never again used in El!rope. In a nutshell, NATO 
represents the politica! co-operation of 16 sovereign democratie nations. If 
they stick together they can infll!ence the historieal process of transformation 
towards our vision of a Europe whole and free. So politically it is needed. 
Third we must extend the ar!TIS contraI process in Europe to the point 
at which defensive postures and transparency make war militarly impossible 
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and politically unthinkable. The signature of a first CFE agreement in Paris 
in just a few day, although an historic event in the fullest sense of the word, 
wilI not by any means represent the culmination of our AIliance efforts to build 
security and stability through arms controI. The immediate consequence of 
CFE signature will be the initiation of follow-on conventional negotiations, 
which I expect wilI focus on manpower issues, and of negotiations on short-
-range nuelear forces. Linked to these SNF talks wilI be the proposal we 
made in London on the elimination of nuelear artilIery from Europe. We are 
also already committed, since London, to longer-term conventional arms nego-
tiations in the 1990s tilat wilI go beyond the transitional aim of elosing off 
the vestiges of the Cold War confrontation and wilI initiate the task of 
structuring the military configuration of the new era that is opening. And, of 
course, the START and then START 11 negotiations and the very important 
chemical weapons negotiations in Geneva are also high on the Alliance's 
agenda. We are determined to use to the full the more constructive stance 
we see now from Moscow to secure as much of tbis agenda as possible. 
Fourth an important task is without doubt the elaboration of a new 
military strategy. The London Summit has laid down some guidelines for this 
exercise, specificaIIy in advocating that the AIliance scale back its military 
forces, as arms control agreements permit, review its force structures and 
change its political stratcgy in line with political change in Europe, especially 
German unification. We will be seeking over the next few years to move 
increasingly towards a «reconstitution strategy» based more on multinational 
units and on the capacity to mobilize sufficient reserves and reinforcements 
in the event of a potential threat. As part of this review, the Alliance will be 
looking to rely less on nuclear forces and make the minimal number that will 
remain in Europe to ensure peace truly weapons of the last resort. 
Fifth we must, as ihe US Secretary of State has eloquentIy suggested, 
redefine the position of the United States in an undivided Europe so as to 
form a new transatIantic partnersbip, «a new AtIanticism». To succeed in this 
task, the AIliance wilI also need to provide a framework in which the 
westem European nations continue to become increasingly aware of their 
global responsabilities now that their economic strength and political sta-
bility make them much more than the fledgling democracies of the immediate 
post-war period. 
34 
THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
Sixth, we have to cope with the new challenges to our security, as 
for example the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass 
destruction. 
The Alliance is in good shape. Solidarity and cohesion have made it poso 
sible for our policies to be successful. And this sucess has certainIy put the 
wind in our sails. This in tum has further strengthened the unity and resolve 
of the Alliance. It has sucessfuIIy passed the test of overcoming the obstacles 
to the fuIl NATO membership of a united Germany. That too is cause for 
optimism. At the same time there are bound to be difficulties in our path 
that we have to avoid or to overcome. But I am certain that we can and will 
overcome them, as we have always done. Our past success must never lead, 
however, to complacency and a false sense of seIf-confidence or indeed a 
premature and inappropriate feeling of triumphalism. In the future, as much 
as in the past, determination, leadership quality, courage and perseverance 
wilI prove essential if we are to maintain our cohesion and solidarity. 
Lisbon, 5 November 1990. 
Manfred Wõrner 
Secretary General af NATO 
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